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Introduction
Often cited as a prime example of successful private sector-led fertilizer market development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Kenya has joined the ranks of SSA countries implementing targeted input subsidy programs (ISPs) for inorganic fertilizer and improved seed (Ariga and Jayne, 2009 ).
Common during the post-independence period of the 1960s and 1970s, then scaled back during structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, ISPs have made a comeback since the early 2000s, and SSA governments currently spend more than US$1 billion on the programs each year (Jayne and Rashid, 2013) . Although the literature on ISPs in SSA has proliferated in recent years, 2 most previous research on the programs has focused on Malawi, Zambia, and Nigeria. There is a dearth of empirical evidence on the effects of Kenya's targeted ISP, the National Accelerated Agricultural Inputs Access Program (NAAIAP). 3 For example, while Sheahan et al. (2014) have analyzed the targeting of NAAIAP, and and Mather and Jayne (2015) have estimated its effects on smallholder farmers' demand for fertilizer at commercial market prices, little is known about the effects of the program on other dimensions of farmer behavior or welfare. This article begins to fill that gap by using household panel survey data from Kenya to answer the question, what are the effects of Kenya's NAAIAP on smallholder crop production, incomes, and poverty?
In the course of this investigation, we also ask, do different quasi-experimental methods lead to the same conclusions about the effects of NAAIAP on smallholder behavior and welfare?
To address the second research question, we employ several different methods, namely:
difference-in-differences (DID) and fixed effects (FE) approaches; propensity score matching-DID (PSM-DID) and calculation of associated Rosenbaum bounds to assess the sensitivity of the results to unobserved heterogeneity; and propensity score weighting-DID (PSW-DID). NAAIAP participants are not randomly selected, so correlation between NAAIAP participation and observed and unobserved factors affecting smallholder behavior and economic well-being must be controlled for in order to obtain unbiased estimates of NAAIAP impacts. Each of the aforementioned approaches deals with the self-selection or endogeneity problem in a different way and relies on different assumptions. Our use of multiple methods allows us to test the robustness of our findings to the choice of estimation approach. It also sets this article apart from previous non-experimental studies of the impacts of government ISPs in SSA, which rely on either panel data and instrumental variables (IV) or control function (CF) methods (e.g., most of the articles reviewed in the 2013 special issue of Agricultural Economics), or PSM (e.g., Chirwa, 2010, and Liverpool-Tasie, 2014b (Ariga and Jayne, 2009; Sheahan et al., 2014) . As a result, subsidized fertilizer 'crowds out' or 'displaces' commercial fertilizer demand at a much higher rate in Kenya than it does in Malawi and Zambia, where private fertilizer markets are less developed. Specifically, while a one-kilogram increase in subsidized fertilizer raises a household's fertilizer use by 0.87 kg in Zambia and 0.82 kg in Malawi, the increase in fertilizer use in Kenya is only 0.57 kg Mather and Jayne, 2015) . 6 One might expect Kenya's ISP to have more muted effects on household production, incomes, and poverty given its relatively modest effect on total fertilizer use. On the other hand, while Malawi's and Zambia's ISPs allocated more subsidized fertilizer to smallholders with greater land and asset wealth , participants in Kenya's NAAIAP tended to be relatively 'resource-poor' farmers with less land or asset wealth (Sheahan et al., 2014) . Thus one might expect larger NAAIAP impacts on poverty than have been found for the Malawi and Zambia ISPs (Mason and Tembo, 2015;  Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2012; Arndt et al., 2014) .
Finally, NAAIAP was implemented through a system of voucher coupons that beneficiary farmers could redeem at accredited agro-dealers for one 50-kg bag of basal dressing fertilizer, one 50-kg bag of top dressing fertilizer, and 10 kg of improved maize seed for free. This input distribution system differs markedly from the systems for Zambia's and Malawi's ISPs during the periods of analysis for the afore-and below-mentioned studies. 7 While the Malawi program uses a voucher system, until recently only the seed vouchers have been redeemable at private agro-dealers' shops;
the fertilizer vouchers had to be redeemed at government depots (Lunduka et al., 2013) . Until 2015/16 when it started to pilot an electronic voucher system in selected districts, the Zambia program did not use vouchers at all, and subsidized fertilizer and seed were distributed through a dedicated ISP system that operated parallel to, rather than through, private agro-dealers . NAAIAP's private sector-oriented voucher program may have improved the timely 6 There have also been studies of crowding out for Nigeria's ISPs (Takeshima et al., 2012; Liverpool-Tasie, 2014a Lunduka et al., 2013) . In general, Kenya's NAAIAP is 'smarter' than ISPs in Zambia and Malawi given its successful targeting of resource-poor farmers and greater engagement of private sector agro-dealers (Morris et al., 2007) . 8 However, NAAIAP is less 'smart' because the rationale for any ISP is much weaker in Kenya than most other countries in SSA due to Kenya's better developed fertilizer markets and strong pre-existing demand for fertilizer (Ariga and Jayne, 2009; .
In what follows, we begin by outlining the key features of NAAIAP. We then describe the data and methods used in analysis, present results, discuss these results with a cross-country comparison of the characteristics and outcomes of several ISPs, and close with a summary of conclusions and policy implications.
Kenya's National Accelerated Agricultural Inputs Access Program (NAAIAP)
First implemented in 2007/08 and running to date, NAAIAP marked the return of fertilizer subsidies to Kenya's input marketing landscape after 17 fertilizer subsidy-free years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) ) (Ariga and Jayne, 2009 ). The overall goal of NAAIAP is "to improve farm input (fertilizer and seeds) access and affordability of smallholder farmers to enhance food security/availability at the household level and generate income from the sale of surplus produce" (MOA, 2007, p. 7) .
NAAIAP also sought to raise productivity and output, and eradicate poverty among smallholder farmers (MOA, 2007 (MOA, , 2010 NAAIAP beneficiaries received vouchers redeemable at participating accredited agro-dealers for free inputs: 50 kg each of basal dressing and top dressing fertilizer, and 10 kg of improved maize seed. The input pack was intended for one acre of maize cultivation. Key eligibility criteria for beneficiary farmers included: (1) being unable to afford farm inputs at unsubsidized prices; (2) growing maize and having at least one acre but less than 2.5 acres of land; (3) being "vulnerable members of society", with preference given to femaleand child-headed households; and (4) not having received government support in the past (MOA, 2007, p. 19) . Participation in NAAIAP was to be a one-time opportunity for beneficiary households. Districts were selected to participate in the program based mainly on the district poverty level and its agro-ecological suitability for maize production (MOA, 2007 1, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 , respectively, and are from Oanda.com. Source: MOA (2013).
Data
The data are mainly from the 1997, 2000, 2004, 2007, and 2010 . This sample covered 22 districts and 107 villages across eight agro-ecological zones (AEZs), and sampling was based on probability proportional to size, with reference to census data. (See Argwings-Kodhek et al. (1998) for further details on the sampling frame, and Sheahan et al. (2013, Figure 1 ) for a map of districts and villages covered in the TAPRA survey) 9 . A total of 1,500 sedentary agricultural households were interviewed in the first wave of the survey and 1,243 (82.9%) households were interviewed in all five waves of the panel. While this is a high re-interview rate given the length of the panel (13 years), attrition bias is still a potential concern. However, we fail to reject (p>0.10) the null hypothesis of no attrition bias for all outcome variables in the study based on regression-based tests recommended by Wooldridge (2010, p. 837 The TAPRA surveys collect detailed information on respondent households' crop and livestock production and sales, off-farm income-generating activities, demographic characteristics, asset holdings, and recent morbidity and mortality. The 2010 wave of the survey also collected data on households' receipt of subsidized fertilizer through NAAIAP, which we henceforth refer to as 'NAAIAP participation'. We complement the TAPRA data with wholesale price data from the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, and historical rainfall estimates from the Climate Prediction Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 9 4. Methods
Outcome Variables and Potential Impact Pathways
Previous studies Mather and Jayne, 2015) have estimated the impacts of NAAIAP on household demand for inorganic fertilizer at commercial (unsubsidized) prices and on total household fertilizer use. In this article, we consider higher-level impacts of NAAIAP on crop production (total area cultivated, maize quantity harvested and output per acre, value of both maize and non-maize crop production, number of field crops grown, and net crop income), net total household income, and Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT, 1984) poverty metrics. See Table 2 for a complete list of outcome variables and associated summary statistics. 11 We single out maize production from other crops because NAAIAP provided beneficiaries with improved maize seed and inorganic fertilizer to be used for maize production. However, we also check for potential NAAIAP effects on the production of other crops, as it is possible that households applied the fertilizer to other crops and/or adjusted their crop portfolio or use of other inputs on other crops upon receipt of NAAIAP. As will be discussed in section 5, results seem to confirm that fertilizer received through NAAIAP was applied predominantly to maize. Maize is also the most important staple crop produced by Kenyan smallholders. 11 Intercropping of maize with other crops is very common in Kenya but the surveys do not apportion intercropped area among crops. Therefore, instead of using the terms 'maize area planted' and 'maize yield' we use, respectively, 'acres planted with maize' (to refer to acres under mono-or inter-cropped maize), and 'maize output/acre' (in kilograms (kg) of maize harvested per acre planted with maize). Similar to previous studies for Kenya using the TAPRA data (e.g., Mathenge et al., 2014) , net crop income is defined as the gross value of crop production minus fertilizer and land preparation costs.
Net total household income is net crop income plus net livestock income (gross livestock income minus feed, salaried labor, and veterinary costs) and off-farm income (income from salaried/wage employment, pensions, and remittances received and net income from formal and informal business activities). Costs other than those mentioned above were not collected in all of the TAPRA panel survey waves and so cannot be netted out. To compute the FGT poverty metrics, we use net total household income relative to the US$1.25/capita/day extreme poverty line.
Poverty incidence is equal to one for households with net total income below this poverty line, and equal to zero otherwise. The FGT poverty gap at the household level is equal to zero for households above the poverty line, and equal to the proportion difference between household income and the poverty line for households below the poverty line. FGT poverty severity at the household level is the poverty gap squared (FGT, 1984) .
Receipt of free fertilizer through NAAIAP could affect the outcome variables through several potential pathways. The most direct pathways are through its impacts on fertilizer use and fertilizer expenditures. and Mather and Jayne (2015) find that an additional kg of subsidized fertilizer raises Kenyan smallholders' total fertilizer use by 0.57 kg on average, ceteris paribus; this is less than 1 kg due to crowding out of the household's fertilizer purchases at unsubsidized prices. Even if NAAIAP completely crowded out commercial purchases (such that it had no impact on total fertilizer use), the household would have received the NAAIAP fertilizer for free and hence experienced a reduction in its fertilizer expenditures. Given previous results that NAAIAP does increase fertilizer use (Jayne et al., 2013, Mather and , holding other factors constant and assuming the fertilizer is applied to maize we would expect to see an increase in household maize production as a result of NAAIAP participation. This could come through an increase in maize yields and/or through an increase in maize area planted.
If other crop activities and prices are unaffected by NAAIAP, then we would expect an increase in total net crop income equal to the increase in net maize income. On the other hand, NAAIAP participation could negatively affect the land, labor, or other resources devoted to non-maize crops, so it is possible that increases in net maize income could be offset by decreases in the production of other crops, resulting in no change in net crop income overall. Similar arguments could be made 12 for positive or no effects on net total income (crop + livestock + off-farm). Alternatively, households might choose to apply some of the NAAIAP fertilizer to crops other than maize, which could positively affect the production of and income from those crops.
An increase in net total income (in per capita terms) resulting from NAAIAP would translate into a reduction in poverty incidence if, for example, the change in income were sufficient to alter a household's poverty status from poor without NAAIAP to non-poor with NAAIAP. However,
given the high rate of poverty in rural Kenya (e.g., the official rural poverty rate was 49% in 2006 (Republic of Kenya, 2007) ) and in our sample (47% of the sample is poor per Table 2), and given that the mean poverty gap among poor households in our sample is 50%, the increase in income resulting from NAAIAP would have to be quite large to substantively affect poverty incidence.
Smaller income increases among the poor would reduce the poverty gap and poverty severity.
Other impact pathways may also be possible. 12 In the next several sections, we outline how we use the TAPRA data to estimate the impacts of NAAIAP on the various outcome variables considered in the article.
Framework for Impact Evaluation of NAAIAP: The Rubin Causal Model 13
The main objective of this article is to estimate the impacts of NAAIAP participation on various dimensions of smallholder behavior and economic well-being. Let Y 1i be the value of a given outcome variable for household i with participation in NAAIAP (i.e., with treatment), and let Y 0i be the household's outcome without participation in NAAIAP (i.e., without treatment). At a given point in time, a household either participates in NAAIAP (
(1) 12 We acknowledge that there may be spillover effects associated with the NAAIAP program, whereby non-direct recipients of NAAIAP may benefit from the sharing of Kilimo Plus packs. Unfortunately, the data are insufficient for a robust analysis of such spillover effects. This is an important area for future research. 13 This section draws on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , Holland (1986) , Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) , and Guo and Fraser (2015) . 13 The treatment effect of NAAIAP for household i is:
(2) but this effect is not directly observable because the household can only be in one state of nature (treated or untreated) at a given time. The population parameters we seek to estimate are the average treatment effect (ATE) or the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of NAAIAP, where:
If NAAIAP participation were randomly assigned, then the potential outcomes would be
ATT , and we could estimate t ATE by comparing the mean outcomes of NAAIAP participants and non-participants. In practice, NAAIAP participation was not randomly assigned, so selection bias/endogeneity is a major concern. This may arise due to program placement effects (e.g., NAAIAP targeted poorer districts) or self-selection (e.g., a household's decision to participate in NAAIAP could be related to unobserved factors that affect the outcomes of interest in this article). We employ various econometric and quasi-experimental approaches (DID, FE, PSM-DID, and PSW-DID) to address these selection bias/endogeneity issues and obtain unbiased and/or consistent estimates of the ATT of NAAIAP. These approaches and their key assumptions are discussed next.
The Difference-in-Differences Estimator (DID)
The data cover periods before and during NAAIAP implementation; thus, one estimator at our disposal is DID. With a household-level treatment indicator, the DID estimate of the ATT is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the parameter t ATT ,DID from the following regression: t = 2004, 2007, 2010 (5) where t indexes the year; dNAAIAP i =1 for NAAIAP participants and zero otherwise; d2010 t =1 for the 2010 survey wave and zero otherwise (recall that NAAIAP was not implemented as of the earlier survey waves); d2007 t =1 for the 2007 survey wave and zero otherwise; e i,t is the idiosyncratic error term; and the β's are the other parameters to be estimated. 14 The key assumption for the DID estimator is parallel trends in Y i,t for NAAIAP participants and non-participants in the absence of NAAIAP. While this assumption cannot be directly tested, we use information from the pre-2010 TAPRA survey waves to check for parallel trends prior to NAAIAP. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the mean changes in the various outcome variables between the 2004 and 2007 survey waves for households that were NAAIAP recipients versus non-recipients as of the 2010 wave, and tests for differences in these means. The differences are not statistically significant (p>0.10) for the vast majority of outcome variables; the only significant differences are for main season net crop income/acre, number of different field crops grown, and main season land cultivated. Thus the data are generally consistent with the key assumption of the DID estimator.
The Fixed Effects Estimator (FE)
Although DID regressions are typically set up as in equation (5), note that with household-level panel data and a household-level variable indicating participation in NAAIAP, t ATT ,DID could be obtained by estimating the following equation via FE: 2004, 2007, 2010 (6) where NAAIAP i,t =1 if household i participated in NAAIAP in year t, and equals zero otherwise; c i is time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity; and u i,t is time-varying unobserved heterogeneity (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007) . Framed this way, the key assumption for FE to produce unbiased and consistent estimates of t ATT ,DID is that NAAIAP i,t be strictly exogenous conditional on c i 14 Note that dNAAIAP i in equation (5) is household-level participation in NAAIAP, not a more aggregate 'exposure-to-NAAIAP' indicator, such as whether NAAIAP targeted a household's division or district. We have requested, but been unable to acquire, administrative data on the divisions or districts included in NAAIAP each year. One typically uses this type of exposure variable in DID models, but there is precedent for using household-level participation in a DID framework (e.g., Michelson (2013) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) ). (Wooldridge, 2010) . This assumption becomes more plausible if we also control for observable (and exogenous) time-varying variables ( X i,t ) that could be correlated with NAAIAP i,t :
X i,t includes a rich set of household, village, and regional characteristics such as prices of key agricultural inputs, lagged prices of key crops (as proxies for expected prices), distances to various markets and services, rainfall-and temperature-related variables, landholding size, lagged productive assets (livestock and equipment), demographic characteristics of the household head, household composition, and recent morbidity and mortality shocks. See Table A2 in the Appendix for summary statistics for all variables in X i,t .
Estimating equation (7) 
Propensity Score Matching-DID (PSM-DID) and Rosenbaum Bounds
An alternative approach to controlling for differences between NAAIAP participants and nonparticipants to obtain unbiased estimates of the ATT is PSM-DID. PSM matches NAAIAP participants with non-participants of similar propensity scores, i.e., similar probabilities of participating in NAAIAP. For PSM, the first key assumption is 'ignorability of treatment' or 'unconfoundedness', i.e., that conditional on observed covariates (X), NAAIAP participation (W) and the potential outcomes are independent:
(Y 1 ,Y 0 )^W | X (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . The second key PSM assumption is that there is overlap: 0 < P(W = 1 | X ) < 1 , i.e., households with the same covariates have positive probabilities of both participation and non-participation in NAAIAP. We estimate a probit model of participation in NAAIAP in the 2010 survey wave as a function of household, village, and regional characteristics as of the 2007 survey wave ( X i,2007 ). The characteristics included in the probit model used to generate the estimated propensity score ( Table A3 in the Appendix) are selected from a larger pool of candidate characteristics (Table A2   16 in the Appendix) following the iterative procedure recommended in Imbens (2014) . There is adequate overlap in these propensity scores, and balancing tests per Dehejia and Wahba (2002) suggest that the balancing property is satisfied (i.e., NAAIAP participants and non-participants have similar propensity scores within blocks in the region of common support). 15 We next match NAAIAP participants and non-participants using two different matching estimators: radius and caliper matching. Rather than using PSM alone to obtain ATTs, we take advantage of the panel nature of the data and use PSM-DID, which controls for differences in both observed and time-invariant unobserved factors between NAAIAP participants and nonparticipants (Heckman et al., 1997 (Heckman et al., , 1998 . The PSM-DID estimator of the ATT is:
where the subscripts refer to NAAIAP participants (1) and non-participants (0); N1 is the number of NAAIAP participants; I1 and I0 are the observations for NAAIAP participants and nonparticipants, respectively; Sp is the common support; and j(.) is a weight that depends on the matching estimator.
Although we have controlled for a rich set of observables as well as time-constant unobservables to obtain t ATT ,PSM -DID , there may still be differences in time-varying unobservables between NAAIAP participants and non-participants that are correlated with NAAIAP participation and affect the outcome variables of interest. This 'hidden bias' would influence t ATT ,PSM -DID (Rosenbaum, 2002) . In the PSM-DID context, we can compute Rosenbaum bounds to test the sensitivity of our estimates to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity (Rosenbaum, 2002; personal communication with M. Gangl, April 2015) . 16 Among other things, Rosenbaum bounds can be used to calculate upper bound significance levels (p-values) for PSM (and PSM-DID) ATT estimates assuming no hidden bias ( = 1, which indicates that matched households have the same probability of participating in NAAIAP), and at various levels of hidden bias ( > 1) (Rosenbaum, 2002; Becker and Caliendo, 2007) . For example,  = 1.1 suggests that households that have similar observed covariates (and hence propensity scores) could differ in their odds of participating in NAAIAP by up to 10% due to differences in unobservables (Becker and Caliendo, 2007) . As discussed in Dillon (2011) and the references therein,  = 2 is generally considered a high level of unobservable differences, and if the upper bound significance level of a given ATT is still below 0.10 when  = 2, the statistical significance of the ATT is considered quite robust to hidden bias. 17
Propensity Score Weighting-DID (PSW-DID)
The fourth and final approach taken to estimate the effects of NAAIAP is PSW-DID. The PSW-DID estimator of the ATT is given by:
where N is the total number of observations; P r( X i,2007 ) is the estimated propensity score; r is the proportion of treated observations in the sample; and all other variables are defined as above (Wooldridge, 2010) . This approach is equivalent to using the estimated propensity scores as weights in a simple DID regression.
Results
To what extent did NAAIAP achieve its goals of raising productivity, output, and incomes, and reducing poverty among Kenyan smallholders? The ATT estimates for NAAIAP participation summarized in Table 3 generally suggest that, other factors constant, NAAIAP boosted maize production by increasing maize output per acre (as opposed to expanding the area cultivated with maize). The lack of significant effect seen for the value of non-maize crop production seems to confirm that recipients did apply the fertilizer sourced through NAAIAP predominantly to maize.
In addition, NAAIAP seems to have increased the maize share of households' total value of crop production. The results further indicate that NAAIAP reduced the poverty gap and poverty severity.
At the same time, although we find statistically significant, positive effects on net total income for one of the five estimation approaches in Table 3 (DID), we find no evidence of statistically significant NAAIAP impacts on net crop income or poverty incidence. The Rosenbaum bounds results in Table 4 suggest that the PSM-DID radius matching-based estimates of the ATT are quite robust to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity (hidden bias).
Among the statistically significant ATT point estimates for this approach, only for the maize share of the total value of crop production does the upper bound significance level exceed 0.10 for a  value of less than 2. In other words, the inferences drawn about the direction and statistical significance of NAAIAP impacts on poverty severity, maize production, and maize output per acre based on PSM-DID with radius matching would still stand if households with similar observed covariates differed in their odds of participating in NAAIAP by 100% due to differences in unobservables. The caliper matching-based PSM-DID ATT estimates are more sensitive to hidden bias, with the upper bound significance levels exceeding 0.10 before =2 for both statistically significant ATT point estimates. Table A4 in the Appendix for the full FE regression results for income per capita per day, maize kg produced (both seasons), area cultivated with maize, and maize output/acre. Full regression results for the other ATT estimates above are excluded due to space considerations but are available from the authors upon request. Source: Authors' calculations. The title of the article poses the question; do different quasi-experimental approaches lead to the same conclusions? The results in Table 3 suggest that DID, FE, PSW-DID, and PSM-DID with radius matching lead to similar conclusions regarding the direction and statistical significance of NAAIAP effects on the outcome variables. (An exception is the estimated ATT on the poverty gap for PSM-DID with radius matching, but with a p-value of 0.126, this result is marginally statistically significant. Other exceptions are that, of these four estimators, only DID suggests statistically significant NAAIAP impacts on net total income overall and per capita.) The main difference across these four estimators is the magnitude of the ATT estimates. PSW-DID generally produces the most conservative point estimates of the ATT. It is only the PSM-DID approach with caliper matching that leads to substantially different inferences. This may be because the matches are relatively poor for caliper matching, which is a one-to-one matching algorithm. Radius matching, in contrast, is a one-to-many matching approach and produces results that are generally similar to DID, FE, and PSW-DID.
The fact that DID, FE, PSW-DID and PSM-DID with radius matching generate similar estimates of the ATT of NAAIAP (at least in terms of sign and statistical significance) is important because most previous non-experimental studies on the impacts of ISPs employ only one or two approaches (typically PSM or panel data methods, but not both in the same paper). While there is no guarantee that these previous studies' findings would also be robust across estimation approaches, our findings increase confidence that their conclusions would still stand even if other methods had been used. The similarity between our FE and PSM-DID with radius matching inferences, as well as the Rosenbaum bounds results indicating that the latter are not sensitive to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, also increases our confidence in the FE estimates. That is, even though we were unable to identify a suitable IV for NAAIAP participation and thus did not estimate FE-IV models, these results suggest that time-varying unobserved heterogeneity is also unlikely to be a major threat to internal validity in the case of our FE estimates. 22
Discussion
This section discusses the magnitudes of the estimated effects of NAAIAP vis-à-vis the analogous effects of Malawi's and Zambia's ISPs. It also discusses the likely reasons for observed differences in the effects of the ISPs across countries including differences in program designs and implementation modalities. We thereby situate our quantitative results within the wider literature on ISPs in order to better understand the policy implications of the findings.
First we ask, how do the estimated effects of NAAIAP on smallholder crop production, incomes, and poverty compare to those of other ISPs in SSA? The estimated NAAIAP ATTs on annual maize production range from a low of 201 kg for PSW-DID to a high of 471 kg for PSM-DID with radius matching. This is a large increase (13-30%) relative to mean household maize production in our sample (1,549 kg). While economically significant in magnitude, these production increases are fairly modest given that a NAAIAP package consisted of 100 kg of fertilizer and 10 kg of improved maize seed. If we attribute all of the maize production increase to fertilizer (which is unlikely), the results suggest a 2.01 to 4.70 kg of maize per kg of subsidized fertilizer response rate. This is higher than the estimated impacts of a 1 kg increase in subsidized fertilizer on maize production in Malawi (1.65 kg/kg per Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2011)) and Zambia (1.88 kg/kg per ). 18 The finding is also consistent with a generally higher estimated yield response to fertilizer in Kenya (approximately 6-7 kg of maize per kg of fertilizer) than in Malawi and Zambia (approximately 3-4 kg/kg), which could be due to better soil conditions or greater familiarity with fertilizer use in Kenya . Table 3 also indicates that NAAIAP increases the maize share of households' total value of crop production by 2-4 percentage points.
This suggests that NAAIAP may be making Kenyan smallholder crop production more maizecentric.
Moving beyond the impacts of NAAIAP on maize, the results in Table 3 imply that NAAIAP has not incentivized Kenyan smallholders to expand their area under cultivation. Given the often binding land constraints in Kenya, the lack of NAAIAP impact on total area cultivated is not surprising. In relatively land-abundant Zambia, the country's main ISP (the Farmer Input Support Program) incentivizes both an area expansion and an increase in the area devoted to maize; however, the additional area brought under maize comes at the expense of fallow land, and not at the expense of the area devoted to other crops . There is also evidence that
Malawi's ISP incentivizes farmers to devote a larger share of their area cultivated to maize (Chibwana et al., 2012) . We find no evidence of NAAIAP impacts on the number of different field crops grown by Kenyan smallholders (a crude measure of crop diversification). 19 We are not aware of results from other SSA countries on the effects of ISPs on crop diversification.
Beyond the effects of NAAIAP on crop production, the estimated reductions in Kenyan farmers' depth and severity of poverty attributable to NAAIAP are also sizeable in magnitude. The results
in Table 3 suggest that participation in NAAIAP reduced the poverty gap by an average of 4 to 10 percentage points, and poverty severity by an average of 4 to 11 percentage points. This is against mean poverty gap and severity levels in our sample of 23.4% and 16.1%, respectively. Although these reductions in the poverty gap and poverty severity were insufficient to reduce poverty incidence, coupled with the findings that NAAIAP did not increase income per capita overall, these results suggest that NAAIAP did significantly raise per capita incomes among the poor.
(Note that reductions in the poverty gap and poverty severity imply per capita income increases among households below the poverty line.) Results from Zambia also suggest that the country's main ISP reduced the severity of poverty but not poverty incidence among smallholder farmers, using the same US$1.25 per capita per day poverty line as we have here (Mason and Tembo, 2015) .
A 100 kg increase in subsidized fertilizer acquired through Zambia's ISP is estimated to reduce smallholder poverty severity by approximately 2 percentage points (ibid.), far less than the estimated impacts of NAAIAP participation on poverty severity (Table 3) . Moreover, at 54.1%, mean poverty severity is much worse in Zambia, so the ISP-related reduction in poverty severity there is even smaller than the associated NAAIAP impact when considered in percentage (and not percentage point) terms. 20 In contrast to our finding that NAAIAP has no statistically significant effect on net crop income, results from Malawi and Zambia do suggest that those countries' ISPs raised net crop income; however, of the three countries, only in Zambia did this translate into significant increases in total household income (Ricker-Gilbert and Mason and Tembo, 2015) .
What might explain differences in ISP effects on maize production and poverty severity in Kenya versus Malawi and Zambia? To a certain extent, the larger impacts of NAAIAP on maize production relative to Malawi's and Zambia's ISPs are surprising because Kenyan smallholders were using significantly more fertilizer without subsidies than were Malawian and Zambian smallholders; relatedly, NAAIAP crowds out more commercial fertilizer demand than the Malawian or Zambian ISPs and thus raises total fertilizer use less than those programs (Ariga and Jayne, 2009; Sheahan et al., 2014; Mather and Jayne, 2015) . But the 'smarter'
features of NAAIAP relative to Malawi's and Zambia's ISPs, particularly NAAIAP's effective targeting of relatively land-and asset-poor farmers (Sheahan et al., 2014) and its implementation through voucher coupons redeemable at private agro-dealers' shops, may have compensated for these shortcomings and contributed to NAAIAP's greater impacts on maize production and poverty severity.
Unlike NAAIAP, Malawi's and Zambia's ISPs effectively target relatively landand asset-rich smallholders , and both deliver subsidized fertilizer (and in the case of Zambia, subsidized seed) to beneficiaries through government distribution systems that largely sideline rather than directly engage and build the capacity of private sector agro-dealers. 21 Within the ISPs of Malawi and Zambia, government distribution systems for subsidized inputs have also been plagued by late delivery, resulting in delayed planting and/or fertilizer application (Lunduka et al., 2013; , whereas inputs obtained with NAAIAP vouchers appear to have been available sufficiently early to enable early planting. For example, based on the 2010 TAPRA data, 96% of the NAAIAP recipients in incidence, gap, or severity using household survey data. Arndt et al. (2014) use a CGE model to estimate the economy-wide effects of Malawi's ISP including its effects on the rural poverty rate, but these estimates are not comparable to our estimates of the household-level poverty effects of NAAIAP. 21 By 'effective' targeting, we mean targeting in practice as revealed by household survey data as opposed to the 'official' targeting criteria based on program implementation guidelines. 25 our sample report having planted their largest maize field 'on time'. Better soil quality and greater familiarity with fertilizer use in Kenya may have also contributed to the more favorable impacts of NAAIAP vis-à-vis Malawi's and Zambia's ISPs. While we cannot determine which of these differences in country context or ISP design and implementation are most important, it is likely that each of them contributed in some way to the greater impacts of NAAIAP on maize production and poverty severity than Malawi's and Zambia's ISPs. Future work could endeavor to quantitatively attribute differences in program effects to differences in specific aspects of ISP design and implementation. 26 in NAAIAP significantly increased maize production by an average of 201-471 kg, ceteris paribus, mainly by raising maize output/acre (as opposed to expanding the area planted with maize).
Conclusions and Policy Implications
NAAIAP also increased the maize share of farmers' total value of crop production but did not affect total area cultivated. Moreover, while the program did not significantly affect net crop income, net total household income, or poverty incidence, it did substantially reduce the poverty gap and severity of poverty (by 4-10 and 4-11 percentage points, respectively). For question (ii), the results are largely robust to the choice of method, with DID, FE, PSW-DID, and PSM-DID with radius matching-based estimates generally leading to same conclusions. Only the PSM-DID with caliper matching-based estimates lead to substantively different conclusions, but this is likely due to the poorer matches achieved with this one-to-one matching algorithm.
A comparison of our results with those seen elsewhere in the literature suggests that NAAIAP had generally larger impacts on maize production than did Malawi's or Zambia's ISPs; moreover, NAAIAP reduced the severity of poverty to a greater extent than did Zambia's ISP. The reasons for this are likely due (at least in part) to NAAIAP's more effective targeting of relatively landand asset-poor farmers (Sheahan et al., 2014) and its implementation through the private sector, rather than the parallel distribution system found in Malawi and Zambia. Beginning in the 2014/15 crop year, some Kenyan counties started implementing their own ISPs to complement the national government-run NAAIAP. So what are the implications of these 27 findings for Kenyan counties? 22 First, like the national-level NAAIAP, county-level ISPs should strive to target resource-poor farmers (to improve program impacts on poverty reduction), and target those that cannot afford fertilizer at commercial prices (to reduce crowding out and increase program impacts on total fertilizer use and maize production). Second, county-level ISPs should continue to use vouchers redeemable at private agro-dealers' shops to crowd in private sector participation and improve timely availability of inputs. Third, as our results suggest that the maizefocused NAAIAP may have led to more maize-centric production systems, county-level ISPs might consider allowing the vouchers to be used for seed for crops other than maize and even other crop inputs (e.g., crop protectants, lime, etc.), farm equipment, and livestock or fisheries inputs to put farmers in the driver's seat and promote diversificationan innovation that is being piloted in Zambia in 2015/16. Ultimately, however, Kenyan counties should carefully weigh the (potentially region-specific) costs and benefits of ISPs, and compare these to other possible measures aimed at assisting smallholder farmers to raise their productivity and incomes. More broadly, it is important that ISPs be viewed not as a silver bullet but as one potential element of a more holistic strategy for promoting sustainable agricultural intensification and rural poverty reduction (Jayne and Rashid, 2013; Jayne et al., 2015) . 22 The national government can also apply these lessons to the activities of its National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB), which is a universal input subsidy program that operates in parallel to NAAIAP. 
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